Assab or How to Make the Best of a Predicament

By Messay Kebede

University of Dayton

Addis Tribune February 1, 2002

Let me begin by explaining why I felt the need to write down and publish my reflections on the question of Assab at this particular juncture. I had taken the decision not to say publicly anything about the issue of Ethiopia’s access to the sea. Not that I overlooked its importance, but because I was not satisfied with the various positions while not having myself a better solution to propose. But in light of the passionate atmosphere created by the proximity of the Hague decision, I thought my silence would be improper, all the more so as I had recently expressed publicly my positions on other controversial issues.

My main contention concerning the various positions on the issue of Assab is that none of them addresses my main concern, to wit, the survival of Ethiopia. The spirit and the manner Ethiopian political adversaries propose to recover or cede Assab hardly counter the adverse forces threatening Ethiopia. From the vantage point of the survival of Ethiopia, Assab is not the number one issue. Change is the chief issue, the only answer to the problems faced by our country. The manner opponents argue in favor of or against the reincorporation of Assab precisely postpones change. To put it bluntly, my position says: we must sacrifice Assab to save Ethiopia, for this sacrifice conditions our change in the direction of modernization. Hence the title: “Assab or How to Make the Best of a Predicament.

urge the reader not to jump to the conclusion that my position does no more than support the decision of Meles government. To be sure, I believe that the issue of peace is the most urgent and paramount concern and that the decision to regain Assab will only compromise the pursuit of peace. In so believing, however, I markedly move away from the TPLF position by underlining the lamentable failure of its policy of peace with Eritrea, itself caused by the implementation of its ethnic ideology. The latter is more dangerous to the survival of Ethiopia than the bellicose Eritrean regime or the loss of Assab. Yes, peace comes first, but with the understanding that divisive policy makes it unattainable. Moreover, unlike the position of Meles government, my appeal to the sacrifice of Assab refrains from endorsing the Eritrean ownership of Assab. It is one thing to give up something in order to get something higher, quite another to deny the right to have it.

For the sake of clarity of conceptualization and discuss, allow me to classify the various positions and arguments under three basic trends. Granted that all classification is somewhat arbitrary, it has the irreplaceable advantage of highlighting the common assumptions as well as the points of divergence. Accordingly, three antagonistic trends are discernable concerning the issue of Assab. 1. The position of the ultra-legalists, mainly represented by the TPLF government, and whose basic argument is that Assab belongs to Eritrea by virtue of colonial treatises. 2. The position of the rectifiers, defended by most Ethiopian intellectuals and opposition parties, and which emphasizes that Assab has never been legally part of Eritrea. 3. The unionists: few in number, the followers of this trend consider the very independence of Eritrea as illegal and advocate a return to unity in some form. Though my sympathy goes to the unionists and rectifiers, my purpose is to show that the three positions defend contradictory views, both legally and politically. I conclude by presenting my own view--which I term the expiationist stand--as a synthesis of the best offered by the conflicting positions.

A note of caution: in this debate on Assab, we must be sure that we examine the problem from the vantage point of Ethiopia’s survival and long term interest. For among those who strongly agitate the issue of Assab, we now find former members and sympathizers of the TPLF. These recent converts to the cause of Assab must not be taken seriously: they bring into the debate a fraudulent interest that only obscures the real issue. Rather than the defense of Ethiopia’s interest, they see an opportunity to hit Meles. As one Hmbasha staff writer puts it, “knowing that this late in the game Assab is a lost cause they are using the issue for a cheap political gain. They should be told in no uncertain terms that they have contributed to the predicament we find ourselves in one way or the other.” (Hmbasha Commentary Page)

The Ultra-Legalists

The main inspiration and justifications of the ultra-legalist position emanate from the TPLF government. Its main argument is that Ethiopia has no right to Assab for the simple reason that the port belongs to Eritrea on the strength of colonial treaties signed by two sovereign states. It is a fact, so the TPLF says, that the treatises signed in 1900, 1902, and 1908 by the Ethiopian and Italian governments for the purpose of demarcating the border between Ethiopia and the then Italian colony of Eritrea places Assab, not in Ethiopia, but in Eritrea. In this regard, Meles himself is perfectly clear:

The assertion that Assab has not been part of the province or whatever of Eritrea is a matter for historians and geographers to determine. I happen to have seen the treaty of 1908 signed by Emperor Menelik and the Italians. That treaty seems to suggest the contrary. Now, one can disown this treaty, if one wishes to but it is difficult to disregard facts as they were then. These facts may be unpalatable to many of us, but however unpalatable, they are facts. Among these facts is the Treaty of 1908, whereby the border between Ethiopia and the Italian colony of Eritrea would be demarcated 60 kilometeres inside from the Red Sea shore, right up to the border connecting Ethiopia, Eritrea and what was then French Somaliland (Ethiopia on the Web)

For Meles, the issue is not whether Ethiopia has the military muscle to reconquer and occupy Assab. As shown by the defeat of Eritrean army, such military capability exists. The real issue is that of right and legality: one cannot recognize Eritrea’s right to independence and help achieve it while amputating a portion of its territory in the name of Ethiopia’s right to the sea. This kind of contention backfires on the very arguments by which the independence of Eritera was supported in the first place. In other words, you cannot reincorporate Assab into Ethiopia without challenging Eritrea’s right to independence.

It goes without saying that the TPLF position is not confined to legality. It also asks us to consider the consequences of a military occupation of Assab. The consequences are such that those who truly speak in the name of Ethiopia’s national and long terms interests should see that the best option is simply to let Assab go. For one thing, to request what internationally recognized agreements expressly rules out is to alienate the international support Ethiopia enjoys in its rightful entitlements. In this affair, the entire African continent stands against us, as the claim to Assab jeopardizes the sacrosanct principle of the OAU, to wit, the respect of borders inherited from colonialism, whether they infringe or not the historical allegation of each country. As the seat of two pan-African organizations and a founding member of the OAU, Ethiopia is expected to be exemplary in this regard. Not to act as a law-abiding nation is to forfeit its right to be the capital of Africa. This is called commitment to the leading role of Ethiopia.

Given that the Eritrean people and government will never accept the Ethiopian claim, the only option is a military occupation of the port. This unmistakably means reviving the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, no longer as a guerrilla war, but again under the different condition of a war between two sovereign states. The enormous human sacrifices and economic costs incurred to repel the Eritrean aggression give a good idea of how humanly catastrophic and economically ruinous the war over Assab will be.

Those who invoke the historical links between Eritrea and Ethiopia before the Italian invasion overlook, the TPLF reminds, the mere fact that Eritreans do not want to be part of Ethiopia. They have sufficiently demonstrated their determination through a prolonged and costly war for independence. No historical justification can go against the expressed wish of the people, and no peaceful outcome can come from a reversal of a decision paid by so much sacrifice. What is most astonishing for the diehard legalists is that some Ethiopians still refuse to understand how greatly mistaken the incorporation of Eritrea into Ethiopia was.

The point is not the military victory that Ethiopia can score here and there; it is the continuation of a conflict with the potential of extremely weakening Ethiopia, both humanly and economically. For Meles and his followers, those who argue that Assab is crucial for the security and prosperity of Ethiopia simply forget that none of the benefits will materialize because their policy makes war inevitable. Clearly, the genuine interest of Ethiopia is to leave Assab to Eritrea, with the understanding that it has no relevance unless it becomes a port that Ethiopia can use freely. Why beget war when we can have the same thing at a much lesser price?

The plain truth, then, is that Assab is not crucial for the security and development of Ethiopia. This is an important piece of the government’s argument: neither the economic development of Ethiopia nor its real security will be seriously undermined by the loss of Assab. Not only are other competing ports available, but also it is manifest that Assab has no an iota of economic future without Ethiopia. The other alternative, however, namely, the military occupation of Assab, is a sure way of blocking the development of Ethiopia by diverting all its resources to the war effort. Reason is entirely on the side of peace.

The Ethiopian government has shown its commitment to peace and legality by withdrawing its victorious forces from Eritrea and accepting negotiation. For the TPLF, this commitment must be rewarded by the recognition of some right of Ethiopia to use Assab. If we add that the colonial treaties justify Ethiopia’s claim concerning other contested territories, then to stick to legality is the best option. Do not forget that the Eritrean attack on Ethiopia was essentially a diversionary tactic to sabotage Ethiopia’s legitimate claims. So let us not condemn the treaties even as they work in favor of Ethiopia.

Indeed, the TPLF government, while accepting the colonial treaties, rejects the maps drawn by Italy on the ground that they do not correspond to the treaties. The Ethiopian News Agency quotes Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Seyoum Mesfin, as saying that “the Italian maps reflected the unilateral interests of colonial Italy and could not serve as an authorised international boundary.” This means that while the return of Assab to Eritrea is in line with the treaties, such is not the case with the other disputed lands. Does this suggest that the Ethiopian government will reject any decision based on the endorsement of the Italian maps? If the answer is yes, it presents the case of a government that sought justice but was denied. This is not the first time that an international body rewards aggressors. In other words, the commitment to legality does not necessary exclude other options, provided that the government refrains from signing a document that it judges unfair.

The Contradictions of the Ultra-Legalists

This reference to illegal maps exposes the contradictions of the ultra-legalists. Does it not imply that in case of a verdict supporting the Eritrean claim the government will resort to other means to defend its legitimate claims? But suppose that the verdict favors the Ethiopian side. Knowing the warlike nature of the Eritrean regime, who can bet on its acceptance of a decision unfavorable to its thesis? In both cases, then, war seems unavoidable. Put otherwise, those who, like the government, say peace at all cost, have no means to prevent war. The eruption of war despite a policy extremely conciliatory to the Eritrean regime had already disproved their position. We now see that they are even less able to guarantee any future to peace. For them, any claim to Assab means perpetual war. Yet, the renunciation of Assab did not prevent war in the past; still less will it prevent it in the future. The policy of peace through the denial of Ethiopia’s right to Assab looks like a complete swindle.

By contrast, it can be shown that Assab is worth fighting for. It is not true to say that Assab is not crucial for Ethiopian security and economic future. Witness: in the 1976 TPLF resolution concerning Assab, an observer notes, “the map of independent Tigray at the time included Assab as its port, underpinning the importance of a sea outlet to an independent country. Here the paradox is obvious: a sea outlet that was considered paramount to an independent Tigray was somehow considered irrelevant to the ethnically federated Ethiopia they subsequently fought for and won.” (Hmbasha Commentary Page) What is more, the argument that Assab is not vital is disproved by the frenzied attempts of the TPLF government to secure a reliable port following the tergiversations of Djibouti, now in Sudan, now in Kenya, even in the war-torn Somalia. This last case shows the extent to which the government is desperate to find a dependable sea outlet.

A no less important contradiction is that the TPLF suddenly loses its ethnic-minded policy when it comes to Assab. It did not hesitate to redraw Ethiopian regions on the basis of ethnic groupings, yet it failed to do so with Assab, which is far from being a Tigre speaking land. The principle of self-administration should have served as an argument at least at the time of independence, all the more so as Assab has been part of Wollo province during Haile Selassie’s regime and then turned into autonomous administrative region by the Derg, precisely as a way of harmonizing administrative boundaries with nationalities.

But this is not all that there is to be said. To officially recognize colonial treaties, which have the devastating effect of depriving Ethiopia of its only maritime outlet, is clearly an anti-Ethiopian stand, a betrayal. Let no one be misled by the reference to the OAU charter concerning the immutability of borders inherited from colonialism. Ethiopia was a sovereign state; its borders were determined by its own historical expansion rather than by colonial treaties. Whereas other African states emerged as a consequence of colonial rule, the Ethiopian state had already an established and internationally recognized territory. The fact that a colonial state grabbed its northern territory does not mean that Ethiopia should recognize this illegal invasion even if it signed a peace treaty. This amounts to asking a sovereign state to consent to the aggression and forceful seizure of its territory. That is why the rejection of Ethiopia’s sovereignty over Assab only reinforces people in their belief that Meles government is at the service of the Eritrean regime. A government perceived by the majority of the population as a sellout cannot ensure peace: it actually invites further claims and invasions.

Last but not least, highly strange and extremely inconsistent is the tendency of the TPLF to consider colonial treaties as legally while contesting the maps that the invader drew. A colonial claim is anything but lawful, as it is based on the negation of all the rights of the native peoples and states. To make a fuss about the illegality of the maps is to forget that for colonialism there are no legitimate borders: all territories simply await conquest. The discrepancy between the treaties and the maps is the very nature of colonialism: it is not a mistake, a breach of any law. Nothing would have been more laughable than this position of the TPLF complaining about a breach of contract by a colonial power were not the destiny of a whole nation at stake.

The Position of the Rectifiers

It is the utter illegality of colonial treaties that the rectifiers emphasize in their argument in favor of the retrieval of Assab. A colonial treaty, however much it may be disguised, is never legal: it remains an imposition with no possibility of ever turning into a mutual consent between equal partners. According to the declaration of the opposition parties,

the colonial atmosphere was in no way a situation wherein two equal parties knowingly and willingly entered into a commitment for mutual benefits. Rather, it was a condition wherein modern powers with superior technology coerced weaker nations militarily into accepting their terms by so-called treaties with a threatening backup of brute force. The treaties that Emperor Menelik II signed with colonial Italy were, for example, not only treaties signed between unequals, but they were also treaties signed under conditions of duress. Had he not signed those treaties, Ethiopia would have lost its sovereignty totally to the European powers that had surrounded it at the time and were poised to partition it among themselves. (Ben’s Page)

The real culprit in this affair is therefore the Algiers Accord. It involves the principle of the OAU pertaining to the immutability of colonial borders when it is but obvious that the principle does not apply to Ethiopia. The borders of Ethiopia do not originate from treaties signed between colonial powers; worse yet, the reference puts Ethiopia in the uneasy position of admitting that it was a colonial state. In accepting the Algiers Accord, the TPLF government has actually surrendered all its rights by positioning Ethiopia as the guilty party.

Moreover, even if one agrees to give some validity to colonial treaties, the invasion of Ethiopia by Italy has annulled whatever legality the treaties had. To quote the declaration of the opposition parties, “those treaties were abrogated--made null and void-- by colonial Italy's naked aggression and invasion of Ethiopia in 1936 in violation of The Covenant of the League of Nations.” As a result, in the Peace Treaty signed in 1947, Italy “renounced all right and title to Eritrea, thus annulling the colonial treaties it had already abrogated by aggression.” (Ben’s Page) So in whichever way one invokes the treaties signed between Italy and Ethiopia, they cannot be used to contest Ethiopia’s ownership of Assab.

As a matter of fact, in terms of legality, Ethiopia can invoke the decision in 1952 of the United Nations General Assembly making Eritrea into a an “autonomous federated unit under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown.” In addition to recognizing Ethiopia’s right of access to the sea, the resolution clearly indicates that the decision to federate is not an imposition but the result of “due consultations with Eritrean parties and peoples.” Why the government is not referring to this international document whose legality has none of the drawbacks of a colonial treaty is a matter of great perplexity indeed.

More yet, Eritrea is legally entitled only to the territories that it had at the time of independence. Assab should not be included for the simple reason that under the Derg it had an autonomous status. Since the OAU resolution refers to borders inherited at the time of independence, it supports Ethiopia’s right to retrieve Assab. Just as the historical claim of Ethiopia to Eritrea was declared illegal on the basis of the respect for borders at the time of independence, so too should Eritrea’s claim to Assab be declared improper by virtue of the same resolution, the key point being here that Assab became part of Eritrea only as a result of the Fascist aggression. In the document that Menelik II signed with Italy, Assab and its environments were not included.

Given all these legal underpinnings, it is clear that the incorporation of Assab into Eritrea will never be accepted by the Ethiopian peoples. Accordingly, the government’s argument according to which the surrender of Assab is a condition of peace is anything but true. One unmistakable lesson of history is that peace can never be built on the endorsement of a flagrant injustice. Add to this the fact that the question of Assab is none other than the issue of Ethiopia’s survival and security. History testifies clearly to the fact that all of Ethiopia’s enemies have invariably attempted to isolate her by cutting off its access to the sea. “Nothing less than the removal of the physical and symbolical strangulation of Ethiopia will bring a lasting peace to the region. It is simply unacceptable for Ethiopia to abide by the colonial era designs of Italy to strangulate Ethiopia by denying her access to the sea,” writes a commentator. (Ben’s Page). To expect a whole nation to give up its right is not to deter aggression; it is to ask for one. Witness: the excessive concessions of the Ethiopian government to the Eritrean regime did not prevent war.

Equally mistaken is the government’s argument that Assab is not economically crucial for Ethiopia. According to an analyst, empirical evidence confirms that landlocked countries experience slower economic growth. From an economic point of view trade competitiveness is reduced when transportation costs of import and export is burdened by charges over which Ethiopia does not have direct control, such as port charges, freight forwarding fees, or custom duties, bilateral trucking and shipping agreements etc. (Ethiopian Commentator)

It is already a fact that, without Assab, Ethiopia becomes the object of economic blackmail and political harassment. Added to the illusive nature of peace, these persecutions show that none of the economic advantages promised by the surrender of Assab will materialize. Ethiopia gets nothing in return; worse, it puts itself at the mercy of neighboring countries committed to its destruction.

The Contradictions of the Rectifiers

Though no doubt the position of the rectifiers speaks in support of Ethiopian interests, it is not immune from inconsistencies. A point in fact is that it denounces the colonial treaties as illegal, but also argues that that the Italian invasion annuls the same treaties. If the treatises are illegal from the start, the invasion cannot add to the cancellation of their legality. The truth is that Menelik signed those treaties as a sovereign, nay, as a victorious emperor; they are therefore valid. In this sense only can the Italian invasion annul the validity of the treaties. But the position of the rectifiers is uncomfortable with this interpretation for fear of admitting that Menelik recognized the inclusion of Assab into the Italian colony. So they protect themselves by denouncing the treatises as illegal agreements forcefully imposed on Ethiopia. In thus presenting Menelik as a victim while denouncing the Italian invasion as a cancellation of the treaties, they both deny and maintain the sovereign nature of the Ethiopian state.

The above contradiction finds a renewed expression in the fact that the rectifiers endorse the OAU charter with respect to the immutability of borders inherited at the time of independence while maintaining that it does not apply to Ethiopia. To begin with, if it is insulting and demeaning to Ethiopia to be asked to recognize colonial borders, one fail to see why it is not so for Africans in general. It is indeed ignoble to ask any African state to recognize the legality of colonial borders. Colonialism has been a naked aggression and a criminal occupation for any African country: it can never become legal, and no African state should be asked to endorse it. The OAU charter did not legalize colonialism; it simply resorted to an accommodation, a convention for the sake of avoiding war and conflicts over contested borders and territories.

If the charter is less a legitimation of colonialism than a useful device, then the case of Ethiopia hardly constitutes an exception. In the name of peace, Africans agree to recognize colonial borders even if they do not agree with them, even if they violate their historical claims. Such is the spirit of the OAU charter that it establishes a ruling admittedly arbitrary to counter a chaotic situation that would surely arise as a result of considering the claims, legitimate or not, of each country. That is why the OAU never took in consideration the claim of the Somali government to Ogaden though the arguments of historical and ethnic links are here undeniable.

The other inconsistency of the rectifiers is that in isolating the case of Assab from that of Eritrea they undermine their own claim. Their rejection of colonial treaties is not consistent enough to refuse the very independence of Eritrea. Through admitting the historical inclusion of Eritrea in Ethiopia, their position maintains that Assab is a separate issue. Because such a position wants to recover Assab while considering Eritrea as a lost cause, it finds the rejection of the independence of Eritrea naïve and self-impairing. In the words of a proponent: “these people base their arguments based on the illegality of the Eritrean referendum and the historical, ethnic and cultural ties between the Eritrean and Ethiopian people. However true these premises are, such a position that denies Eritrea’s right to exist as a state is harmful to Ethiopia’s interest, as it would dampen the international community’s sympathy for Ethiopia to have its own coastline.” (Ben’s Page) Yet it springs to mind that if the colonial treaties concerning Assab are not valid, neither are they legitimate in the case of Eritrea.

This attempt to isolate the case of Assab while accepting the independence of Eritrea is damaging in that it suggests that the incorporation of Eritrea had nothing to do with the historical right of Ethiopia and with the noble cause of reuniting the forcefully detached province with the motherland. These were simply false protests designed to cover up the real purpose, namely, to take hold of the port. Some such position only reinforces Eritreans in their belief that they were right to seek independence from Ethiopia.

The Unionist Position

The unionist position precisely stigmatizes the attempt to separate the issue of Assab from that of Eritrea as inconsistent and damaging. The rejection of colonial treaties must be total and consistent to the point of refusing the independence of Eritrea as illegal. As one exponent writes: “the coastal territory of Ethiopia including the Asab Region and Eritrea were also illegally taken over by Italy. With the end of colonialism and Italian defeat, all Ethiopian patrimony, the litoral lands, the cultural artifacts, the religious icons, etc. should have been returned to Ethiopia.” (Ben’s Page) But what about the OAU charter, signed by Ethiopia, and expressly referring to the respect of borders inherited from colonialism?

According to the unionist view, Ethiopia is in no contradiction when it maintains its right to Eritrea while signing the OAU charter for the simple reason that the Ethiopian state did not emerge as a result of colonial treaties. Ethiopia was neither created by colonialism nor was itself a colonizer: it was a sovereign state whose northern territory was taken away by force. As shown by the history of Europe, countries that lost parts of their territory as a result of war are allowed to recover them as a matter of right and as a condition of peace. So it is for Ethiopia. In the words of a proponent, “the argument that most African states were made nations following colonial border demarcation and Ethiopia-Eritrea case should be treated the same way does not hold because Ethiopia had never been colonized. Ethiopia did not colonize Eritrea, either, for the latter was part of Ethiopia and should have legally and formally been given back to Ethiopia at the end of Italian colonization.” (Ben’s Page) Be it noted also that Eritrea never achieved an independent existence. It was either part of Ethiopia or a colony that directly acquired a federated status without its borders being ever established in the legal sense of the word.

From the legal point of view, then, the rejection of the independence of Eritrea is the only consistent position. Besides Eritrea being historically part of Ethiopia, its reunification was backed and openly endorsed by the international community. The UN federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia is:

the basic legal act that established Ethiopian sovereignty over Eritrea in 1952. In 1962 the Eritrea assembly in Asmara voted for full union with Ethiopia, dissolving the 1952 Federation. This act has never been challenged in international courts and was accepted by the international community as a decision of the representatives of the Eritrean people. (Ben’s Page)

As to the argument of peace so reiterated by the government, the devastating war that broke out between the two countries and the adverse economic costs of independence for both countries clearly show that the condition of peace is reunification. On the basis of the colonial treaties and separation, nothing just and satisfactory can be achieved. In particular, peace will remain illusive, and this is what the 1952 UN resolution had clearly understood. The appalling costs of independence together with the argument of historical links and mutual economic interests should take both countries into a compromise. Separation serves none of their basic interests; still less does it achieve peace. Unity in some form is worth reviving. One observer depicts the reason for a return to unity as follows:

I believe the Ethiopian and Eritrean people should go beyond mere legal bickering, cut and dry politicking and temporal expediency. For the sake of lasting peace both states should, at best renounce colonial borders and reunite or at least, come to equitable terms such that Ethiopia should maintain its access to the sea and Eritrea should keep its productive western hinterlands. Unless such a compromising solution, with the consent of the people through their parliament or some kind of referendum, is given, the world should be ready to witness series of blood bath in the Horn of Africa. (Ben’s Page)

The nature of the unity is a matter for negotiation: short of total inclusion, it can assume a federal or a confederal form. The point is the harmonization of Eritrea’s and Ethiopia’s interests through a political arrangement that neutralizes their contentious claims. Unity in some form gives Ethiopia an access to the sea while allowing Eritrea to retain contested territories. Clearly, compromise is the way to peace.

I admit that the unionist position appears to me as the most consistent and thoroughgoing solution. I would have supported it had it not the flaw of being unrealistic. Not that I categorically exclude a return to unity, but because the prevailing animosity and suspicion come against any reunification of the two countries in the foreseeable future. It is just not possible to assume that reunification is at present a political option when Eritrean identity and pride owe so much to anti-Ethiopian feelings. Moreover, to present reunification as the sole condition of peace is little flattering, as it suggests that both countries are unable to reach any other accommodation. It is also dangerous for the reason that it makes war inevitable: if reunification through negotiation fails, as it certainly will, given the prevailing hostility, the option of reunification through war will appear as the only alternative.

The Expiationist Position

This recurring issue of peace is the trigger that brings about my own proposal. I already indicated that I define it as an expiationist position to signify that it promotes not so much a political solution as an ethical process of recovery. It rests on the paramount importance of achieving peace for the very survival of Ethiopia. Because I believe that the positions of the unionists and rectifiers ultimately lead to war, my position drifts away from them while sharing their concern for Ethiopia’s right and welfare. However, it remains quite distinct from the position of the TPLF government: it too makes war inevitable as a result of an internally divisive policy that weakens Ethiopia and encourages Eritrea to become more demanding and intransigent. You do not guarantee peace by tearing Ethiopia apart.

My position does not say peace at all costs, but peace because we have other more important and pressing matters to deal with. It involves a deliberate and argued option for peace, not a denial of right or a self-damaging capitulation. To put it in a nutshell, what threatens Ethiopia is less the loss of Assab than the pursuit of the ethnic politics. For those who insist on the strategic importance of Assab for Ethiopia’s survival and economic prosperity, I just remind that keeping Assab means continuous war with Eritrea. In light of the nature of the Eritrean regime, I do not see Ethiopia keeping Assab other than through military means. I agree that such a military occupation is possible. Unfortunately, military victory does not mean peace. A continuous war will make Ethiopia economically vulnerable. Make no mistake about it, economic failure is the harsh enemy of Ethiopian unity. We have indeed bigger problems in our hands, and we need peace to cope with them.

Nor must we overstate the importance of Assab. No doubt, access to the sea would facilitate economic growth, but it will neither cause it nor hamper its happening if the country gets down to serious work. Ethiopia’s geographical, demographical, and economic importance posits Assab as a natural port. So that, provided the country is united and economically promising, Eritrean leaders will soon understand that their best interest is to facilitate Ethiopia’s port needs. Our skill and commerce determine our future, not a maritime access. Ethiopians were not better off when they controlled Assab.

This is to emphasize that what we really need is to change, and the issue of Assab can be profitably used to effect the change. Assab may be the price that we must pay for positive, modern change. We must come round to the idea that we must sacrifice Assab for the sake of peace, and most importantly, for the sake of changing ourselves. Herein lies the great difference between my position and the TPLF government. The latter denies that Ethiopia has any right to Assab, while I speak of sacrifice, thereby implying that the surrender is a deliberate choice, a price that we pay in order to get something higher, namely, our own transformation. Sacrifice implies consent to a painful, tearing decision that changes us because it invites us to surpass ourselves, to overcome our anger and frustration.

In this way, we recover the wisdom of Menelik, mainly imparted by the sheer understanding that Ethiopia is weak and cannot have everything. Menelik understood that he could get away with one military victory over a colonial power so long as it was not followed by the attempt to dislodge a colonial power from the Horn altogether. By signing the colonial treaties, he greatly softened the Italian humiliation, thereby diffusing any attempt of the Italian government to appeal to national mobilization, just as he reassured the two most powerful colonial powers, namely, France and Great Britain. To quote a commentator,

after Adwa, Ethiopia did not attempt to recapture Eritrea from the Italians and this perhaps is the Achilles heel of Menelik although we must understand it in the context of the Scramble for Africa by European colonial powers. Then, Ethiopia's options were limited to the preservation of its independence, but the question of outlet to the sea will remain a priority in Ethiopia's endeavor with the outside world. (Ben’s Page)

I disagree with the conclusion making the possession of a port into a priority for the simple reason that the main threat is elsewhere. What is expected of intellectuals and leaders is to explain that sacrifice is necessary if we want to accomplish the goal of economic development. Yes, it is unfair, but we must accept it if we want to move on.

Above all, retrieving Menelik’s wisdom means that we must stop bragging. An article on the web says: “in this regard it should be understood that Ethiopia’s right to Assab and her access to international waters are not negotiable. These are questions of paramount importance. The survival of a nation cannot be subordinated to any international agreements and Ethiopia cannot simply sign a suicide note prepared for her by her adversaries.” (Ethiopia on the Web) This kind of statement baffles me by its utter disregard of the deep problems in which Ethiopia is sunk. Is Ethiopia really in a position to dictate its conditions to the international community? Equally perplexing is the refusal to admit that Ethiopians and Ethiopians alone--it is true under the misguided leadership of the educated elite--have put their country in a terrible mess, and that the time has come to pay the price. Mistakes must be paid; the point is to pay for them in such a way that they initiate regeneration. This is called expiation.

Consider the case of Germany. While divided because of the mistake it made, it did not allowed itself to become bogged down in the refusal of the separation, doing nothing else but wallowing in its frustration and preparing for war. It accepted the division as a punishment for its mistake, and resolutely decided to transform itself by becoming an economic power. The decision paid: the Western part became economically so attractive that reunification occurred without one bullet fired as soon as the cold war came to an end.

We need to be patient: international treaties change; borders are made and unmade. Governments recognized Korea as one country at one time; today, two Koreas exist, but apparently not for long. Likewise, governments recognized two Yemens at one time; today there is only one Yemen. China is still divided, but the conditions of reunification are gathering momentum.

To conclude, let me indicate where all this should lead. The sacrifice of Assab for the sake of achieving peace should awaken the Eritrean people and persuade them into a gesture of reciprocity. Since Assab is of no direct use to them, they should cede it to Ethiopia in exchange for other compensations or even simply rent it. This reciprocal gesture will start a new era of cooperation between the two countries that can grow into friendship, perhaps even into some form of reunification in the distant future. Need I say that nothing of the kind is likely to happen so long as Ethiopian and Eritrean peoples tolerate the suffocating and divisive cliques that presently control their respective government?

Editorial Comments: We categorically reject the Author’s closing call to “cede or lease (rent) Assab to Ethiopia” because there is no reason in the world that prevents Ethiopia from accessing Assab without owning or leasing (rent) it. We assert: There are no port transactions, which Ethiopia can’t accomplish without owning or Leasing Assab? Eritrea’s sovereignty is non-negotiable, period.